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INTEREST FREE LOANS
WALLER H. HORSLEY
The 52nd anniversary of the modern federal gift tax was June 6, 1984: the
effective date of the new tax rules applicable to interest-free and below-
market interest loans. I.R.C. § 7872, as added by § 172 of the Tax Reform
Act of 1984 (TRA).
Despite an express exception for seller loans arising from the sale of prop-
erty and covered by revised § 483 or new § 1274, § 7872 is not by its terms
limited to loans of money: an area highlighted on February 22, 1984, by the
Supreme Court's opinion in Dickman that, in dictum, discussed the broader
concept of transfers of the use of property generally.
At this stage, however, I do not believe new § 7872 will be expanded to
impute income in cases of "loans" of property other than money; for exam-
ple, an accommodation pledge of securities or the free use of facilities (e.g.,
the family car or vacation cottage). Nevertheless, the Conference Report
makes clear that within § 7872-
"It is intended that the term 'loan' be interpreted broadly in light
of the purposes of the provision. Thus, any transfer of money that
provides the transferor with a right to repayment may be a loan.
For example, advances or deposits of all kinds may be treated as
loans." Conf. Rep., H.R. 4170, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1018 (June
23, 1984) (herein "Conf. Rep. ").
It is hard to predict, therefore, what money or credit transactions, no mat-
ter how innocent, will escape the reach of the new statute if they are thought
to have any "significant effect on any Federal tax liability of the lender or the
borrower." I.R.C. § 7872(c)(1)(E). For example, in their infancy split-dollar
insurance programs were considered to be, in effect, interest-free loans from
the premium payor (or cash value owner) to the insured (or death benefit
owner). Whether these transactions now fall under the statute must await a
further announcement from the Internal Revenue Service.
In establishing the new rules, the lawmakers insisted that "[n]o inference is
intended with respect to the application of present law to any below-market
loan outstanding prior to the effective date." Conf. Rep. 1023. What then is
the proper income and gift tax treatment of interest-free and below-market
interest loans for 1983 and prior years, and for the interim January 1-June 6,
1984 period?
I. Pre-1984 Loans
There have always been different rules for the tax treatment of demand
loans and term loans. In general, the controversies have arisen in .three types
of loan transactions: family or gift loans, compensation-related loans and
corporation-shareholder loans.
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A. Income Tax
The government has consistently failed in its attempts, begun just 23 years
ago, to impose income tax liability on borrowers in cases involving
compensation-related and corporation-shareholder loans made interest-free or
at below-market interest rates. In the gift loan area, questions have been
raised about below-market loans to trusts under traditional assignment of
income and Clifford trust principles (e.g., a demand loan to a trust is nothing
more than a revocable transfer, so the argument goes); but, where a valid
debtor-creditor relationship has been established, there are no reported
income tax cases on either side.
B. Gift Tax
A low-interest term loan has always been recognized as a transfer of value
from lender to borrower. In family cases, this has traditionally resulted in a
reportable gift. E.g., Blackburn v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 204 (1953). The
only real controversy in the past was whether the gift tax applied to a
demand loan, and this was resolved on February 22, 1984 by the Supreme
Court's decision against the taxpayer in Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S.
,79 L.Ed.2d 343, 84-1 USTC 13,560, 53 AFTR2d 148,627 (1984).
What has never been finally determined, however, is how to value low-
interest loans for tax purposes; that is, whether to use a commercial rate after
taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances (e.g., the credit-
worthiness of the borrower), the local prime rate, the current tax deficiency
rate, an average U. S. Treasury bill rate, or whatever.
Within a week after the Dickman decision, the government announced
that it would insist on full retroactive effect. This placed in jeopardy all
interest-free and low-interest demand loans made since June 6, 1932 "for less
than an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth." See
I.R.C. § 2512(b); Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(g)(1) (donative intent is not
essential).
Pressure was immediately directed at Congress from both taxpayers and
their tax return preparers, using the same arguments already successfully
pressed in the House for prospective-only treatment of net gifts after the
Supreme Court's decision in Diedrich v. Commissioner, 457 U.S. 191 (1982).
The net gift proponents won (TRA § 1026); the interest-free loan proponents
lost.
Unquestionably persuasive to the legislators was the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice's announcement on May 11, 1984 of an amnesty for what it deemed to
be non-abusive gift situations, establishing a uniform valuation standard and
a generous reporting exception for pre-1984 taxpayer compliance. IRS
Announcement 84-60, 1984-23 I.R.B. 58 (June 4, 1984). Technically, the
announcement applies only to interest-free demand loans (obviously, the
great bulk of gift loans), but the same principles may also be applied to
low-interest demand loans. A Revenue Procedure was promised, but at this
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writing has not been published.
If the unused annual gift tax exclusion(s) or the new IRS administrative
reporting exception does not apply, a lender's interest-free loans outstanding
in 1981, 1982 or 1983 are subject to gift taxes and future bracket creep, as
are his interest-free loans for any other open gift tax year (i.e., any period
since June 6, 1932 in which a gift tax return was not filed, or any quarter or
year within the last 6 years for which a gift tax return was filed but the value
of the omitted gifts exceeds 25% of the total amount of gifts stated in the
return).
The announced valuation standard is remarkable in its simplicity, espe-
cially when compared with the new rules under § 7872. The value of the
pre-1984 gift element inherent in interest-free demand loans can be deter-
mined by applying simple annual interest derived from the lesser of (a) the
statutory rate for refunds and deficiencies or (b) the annual average rate for
three month Treasury bills. On this basis (and without the even more favora-
ble administrative reporting exception described below), a lender's per donee
safe harbor over the last ten years would compute as follows, just using his
annual exclusion(s) (assuming no other reportable gifts that year):
Applicable Annual Average
Year Interest Rate Exclusion(s) Loan Balance
1983 8.6% $10/20,000 $116,279/232,558
1982 10.6% $10/20,000 $94,339/188,679
1981 12.0% $3/6,000 $25,000/50,000 *
1980 11.5% $3/6,000 $26,086/52,173 *
1979 6.0% $3/6,000 $50,000/100,000
1978 6.1% $3/6,000 $49,180/98,360 *
1977 5.2% $3/6,000 $57,692/115,384
1976 4.9% $3/6,000 $61,224/122,448
1975 5.8% $3/6,000 $51,724/103,448
1974 6.0% $3/6,000 $50,000/100,000
*But see the special $50,000/100,000 exception described below.
Further, the IRS announcement relieves a married couple from any obliga-
tion to file a gift tax return if the previously unused balance of their annual
per donee exclusions would absorb the computed value of their interest-free
demand loans to that donee/borrower.
Even if the lender should fail the traditional test under the simplified valua-
tion rule (as might be the case in 6 out of the last 10 years above, if there had
been even modest additional gifts from the donor/lender to the donee/bor-
rower), most non-abusive interest-free loans will be sheltered under the new
administrative reporting exception. Announcement 84-60 states that no pre-
1984 gift tax reporting is required if the average annual outstanding balance
of interest-free demand loans made by a single taxpayer to a single donee
does not total, in the aggregate, more than $50,000 each year. If the donor
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was married at the time, interest-free demand loans aggregating $100,000 per
donee becomes the cliff over which the lender must fall before being faced
with pre-1984 gift tax reporting. Loans made to a trust or other entity (for
example, the Dickmans' closely-held corporation) are deemed made propor-
tionately to the individuals who have a beneficial "present interest in the loan
proceeds or the income attributable to the loan proceeds."
If a taxpayer falls within the $50,000 ($100,000, if married) per donee
administrative reporting exception, then he can completely disregard the fact
that other gifts were made to the same donee that year, taxable or not; and,
as important as any other feature, he does not have to worry about the
cumulative effect of his interest-free gift loans on his future gift or estate tax
rates. If his interest-free demand loans total $50,001!100,001 in any year,
however, he gets no mercy, and must run the gauntlet with his available
annual exclusion(s) and with only the comfort of the simplified applicable
interest rates.
C. Estate Tax
For estate tax purposes, § 20.2031-4 of the Regulations has always allowed
an executor to establish a lower market value for any indebtedness held. In
the case of an interest-free demand note, this value was presumptively its face
amount unless it had become uncollectible. For term loans, an appropriate
date-of-death or alternate value discount could be applied reflecting the then
current interest rates in the community.
The real problem in the estate tax area, however, is the potential for prior
gift tax liabilities (tax, interest and penalty) and, more importantly, bracket
creep for all years after 1976 when the gift and estate tax were integrated.
Not only will a conscientious executor be faced with a potential review for
family loans back to June 6, 1932, but also with a significantly higher estate
tax bracket for the present if any post-1976 over-$50,000 (or $100,000, as
the case may be) loans are discovered.
II. 1984 Loans to June 7, 1984
New § 7872 applies only to loans made after June 6, 1984. This includes
pre-June 7, 1984 demand loans that are not repaid before September 16,
1984, and pre-June 7, 1984 term loans that are renegotiated, extended or
revised after June 6, 1984. Thus, the pre-1984 income, gift and estate tax
rules still apply to loans made or outstanding during the period January 1,
1984 to June 7, 1984.
By its terms, the special administrative reporting requirements for gift taxes
(e.g., the $50,000/$100,000 interest-free demand loan exception) do not
apply during 1984, unless blessed with an extension of administrative grace
in a further announcement this year. The preparation of 1984 gift tax returns,
therefore, will have to deal with an as yet unconfirmed interest rate applica-
ble to gift loans outstanding during the period January 1-June 6, 1984; or to
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the payoff date before September 16, 1984, for demand loans repaid during
that grace period.
Although recently announced Rev. Rul. 84-163 (November 19, 1984)
offers interest rates for 1984 for purposes of new § 1274, it does not by its
terms approve the use for gift tax purposes of 10%, compounded semiannually,
for the January 1, 1984 to June 30, 1984 timeframe. Absent further clarifica-
tion by the Service, however, this rate would seem to be the one to use.
III. Post-June 6, 1984 Loans
The value of a loan of money must now be determined by reference to the
market interest rate established by the Code. Specifically excluded are loans
arising from sales of property, but only if covered by amended § 483 and new
§ 1274 of the Code (i.e., most seller-financed property sales). I.R.C. §
7872(f)(8).
For the period June 7, 1984 to December 31, 1984, the Act establishes
10%, compounded semiannually, as the interest rate to be used. TRA §
172(c)(4). Even this favorable rate appears to be higher than Announcement
84-60's use of the annual average rate for three month Treasury bills, applied
as simple interest, but is lower than the 10.50% "applicable Federal Rate"
(semiannual compounding) for demand loans for the period July 1, 1984 to
December 31, 1984, established in Rev. Rul. 84-163.
A. Valuation
Valuing a demand loan now involves a computation of "foregone interest."
I.R.C. § 7872(a); § 7872(e)(2). Stated as simply as possible, interest on an
outstanding demand loan is deemed to accrue on December 31 of each year,
apparently compounded semiannually at "the applicable Federal rate"
announced by the Secretary during the prior year's October (effective Janu-
ary 1) and the year's April (effective July 1), based on the average market
yield (during the April-September and October-March timeframes) of mar-
ketable U.S. obligations with remaining maturities of 3 years or less.
For example, if an employer makes a $100,000 advance to an employee
during 1986, with 5% interest payable annually, and the applicable Federal
rate for demand loans happens to be 12% for the entire year, the amount of
"foregone interest" for 1986 would be:
Loan amount $100,000
January 1 - June 30
(181/365 x 12%) 5,951 $ 5,951
$105,951
July 1 - December 31
(184/365 x 12%) + 6,409
Total interest $12,360
Interest payable (5%) - 5,000
Foregone interest $ 7,360
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[Note: There is currently some dispute as to whether the value of demand
loans in 1985 and subsequent years must be computed using semiannual
compound interest. This writer has been assured by a member of the Joint
Committee Staff that Congress intended compound interest to be used
throughout, and that clarification will be forthcoming. Rev. Rul. 84-163
seems to support this view, even if not explicitly.]
For term loans, the amount to be reckoned for tax purposes is "the excess
of (A) the amount loaned, over (B) the present value of all payments which
are required to be made under the terms of the loan." I.R.C. § 7872(b)(1).
Using the above example, with a loan due December 31, 1986 (i.e., a one-
year term loan), the taxable amount would be:
Amount loaned $100,000
Present value of $105,000
(6% discount, 2 periods) 93,450
Excess $ 6,550
Assuming all facts are the same, an acknowledged term loan involves a
smaller transfer than a demand loan (i.e., $810 or 11% less interest in the
above example). Since the statute directs (purportedly for simplicity, see
Conf. Rep. 1020 fn. 11) that all term gift.loans be treated as demand loans
for income tax timing and computation purposes (but not in the selection of
the interest rate or for any gift tax purposes), some will say that gift loans are
given harsher treatment than compensation-related or corporation-share-
holder loans under the statute.
The interest rate for every term loan is fixed on the date the loan is made
and is carried forward at that initial rate. The interest rate on a true demand
loan, on the other hand, fluctuates, up or down, at the higher or lower
"applicable Federal rate" of interest for each January-June and July-
December period. Thus, if income tax considerations are controlling, a gift
loan would fare better under the demand loan valuation rules in times of
declining interest rates, and worse in times of rising interest rates.
Moreover, a true demand loan gives a donor/lender more control over the
use of his available gift tax exclusion(s) if the funds are expected to remain
outstanding beyond December 31. For true demand loans, each year is a
separate valuation period for gift tax purposes, even with its varying interest
rates. For example, if demand loans have an average interest rate of 12%, a
combined $20,000 annual exclusion could absorb a $161,800 interest-free
demand loan that year, whereas only a $61,875 4-year loan would be within
the combined $20,000 annual exclusion this year, even if made at the low
10% transition discount rate: again, if gift taxes are the only consideration!
B. Income Tax
1. The Lender
Interest income will now be imputed to every lender who lends more than
$10,000 to another, if any of his loans are made after June 6, 1984 at a rate
below the applicable Federal rate.
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In the case of most compensation-related loans, the lender will not be hurt
by this treatment because its imputed interest income can be offset by an
increase in its deduction for compensation paid, assuming this additional
compensation represents reasonable compensation (i.e., is not a dividend)
and, if the borrower is an employee, he already earns more than the FICA
wage base (increasing to $39,600 in 1985). Of course, if the lender is a
personal holding company or S corporation, it may be embarrassed by the
receipt of additional interest income.
The lender of a gift loan or a corporation-shareholder loan, however, has
no offsetting deduction, since his deemed transfer to the borrower constitutes
a non-deductible gift, dividend or return of capital. Accordingly, the income
tax impact on gift loans and corporation-shareholder loans will chill such
transactions in the future, at least as far as any assignment of income aspects
are concerned. [Note: The category of corporation-shareholder loans also
covers below-market loans from shareholders to their corporations.]
Compensation-related term loans, however, deserve a more extended
explanation. Seldom will they now be beneficial to the borrowing employee
or service-provider.
New § 7872 adopts what was referred to in the preenactment literature as
the "two-transaction approach." The first part of the transaction is a transfer
of value from lender to borrower (i.e., employer to employee, corporation to
shareholder, donor to donee, etc.), and the second part of the transaction is a
retransfer or payment of interest by the borrower back to the lender (or from
employee to employer, shareholder to corporation, donee to donor, etc.). In
the case of an employer/employee (or other compensation-related loan
where the lender can offset the deductible value of his deemed payment
against his imputed interest income), a demand loan creates a "wash," since
both sides reckon their payments on December 31. I.R.C. § 7872(a)(2). In
the case of a conventional compensation-related term loan, however, there is
no "wash" because of the application of the new original issue discount
(OLD) rules to the interest (or second step) in the transaction.
What this means is that, if an employer on July 1, 1985 lends $100,000 to
an employee repayable in two years without interest, and the applicable fed-
eral rate is 12% at the time the loan is made, the following will result:
First, the employer will be deemed to have paid additional compensation
of $20,791 on the date the loan was made, and have an offsetting compensa-
tion deduction (assuming reasonable compensation). The employer's FICA
liability will also attach at this time.
Second, the employee will have an additional $20,791 in compensation on
the date the loan is made. Somehow he must contribute his portion of the
FICA withholding liability if, at the time the loan was made, any part of his
compensation for the year was below the social security wage base (initially
$39,600 for 1985)-perhaps as an additional interest-free loan (i.e., an
advance) when his employer makes its tax deposit.
Third, the employer will realize a varying amount of interest income over
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the two-year term under the new OID rules; namely, $4,753 in calendar
1985, $10,378 in calendar 1986 and $5,660 in calendar 1987. This will
mean that the employer will have a compensation deduction in 1985 (i.e.,
$20,791) much larger than its interest income that year (i.e., $4,753), and
unsheltered interest income in 1986 and 1987.
Fourth, the employee will also get an interest deduction only on the OID
methods, meaning that he will have a much smaller deduction (i.e., $4,753)
than the additional compensation income he is deemed to receive in the first
year $20,791).
Thus, there is no "wash" as between the first and second steps of the
transaction. Indeed, the employer can accelerate a deduction (not offset by an
equivalent amount of interest income) if the employee can stand accelerated
income in the first year. Ingenious practitioners can also be expected to
search for loopholes in the cancellation of indebtedness and prepayment
rules, at least as long as Congress continues to deny more sweeping realloca-
tion of income and deduction powers to the tax collector under § 482.
There is one statutory exception in the employer-employee term loan area.
A term loan made after June 6, 1984 that is not transferable and "the bene-
fits of the interest arrangements of which is [sic] conditioned on the future
performance of substantial services by an individual" will be treated as a
demand loan for all timing purposes of new § 7872 (but not for computing
the interest rate, where "the applicable Federal rate" for the stated term will
still apply). I.R.C. § 7872(0(5). As a demand loan, the parties' compensation
income/deduction and interest income/deduction will accrue ratably
throughout the year at the applicable Federal rate, compounded semiannu-
ally, and be transferred on the last day of the calendar year (except as may
otherwise be specified by the regulations that are supposed to neutralize any
tax advantages that may accrue to a fiscal year taxpayer).
The same opportunity does not exist for corporation-shareholder term
loans because the corporation gets no deduction for its deemed transfer (i.e.,
dividend or return of capital). A term loan from the family corporation
would be enticing only in those rare instances when a shareholder wanted to
accelerate income into his first year-perhaps to absorb an expiring carryover
deduction or deal with an alternative minimum tax problem.
2. The Borrower
On the borrower's side, he is deemed to have received an equivalent pay-
ment of additional compensation or dividends (or return of capital), or a
tax-free gift depending on the loan's context. As additional compensation,
there can be more employee FICA taxes to pay. With his imputed income
from the first step transaction and presumably additional income from his
investment of the loan proceeds, the borrower will have a higher threshold
for his medical and casualty loss deductions, or an expanded base for deduct-
ing contributions to charity.
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Since the demand loan borrower who itemizes will normally have an
offsetting deduction (or, in the case of a gift, a new deduction), the new
income tax rules would appear to weigh more heavily on the lender in the
corporation-shareholder and gift loan cases. The special damage possible to
the employee or shareholder borrower under a term loan has already been
noted. In every case, the borrower will be embarrassed if his imputed interest
payment back to the lender is disqualified as a tax deduction because of his
holdings of tax-exempt securities or violation of the excess investment interest
rules.
3. Exemptions
Congress has delegated broad authority to the Secretary to "prescribe such
regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of
this section," and even to adopt "regulations exempting from the application
of this section any class of transactions the interest arrangements of which
have no significant effect on any Federal tax liability of the lender or the
borrower." I.R.C. § 7872(g)(1). The area of interest-free loans between
estates, trusts and their beneficiaries is not mentioned in the statute or com-
mittee reports. Obviously, much valuable information on the scope and effect
of the new rules must be imparted by the Regulations, whenever published.
The congressional conferees seemed to be particularly concerned about
existing loans made to a continuing care facility by its residents, and felt it
necessary to include a specific exception for any transaction of this type
entered into before June 6, 1984. TRA § 172(c)(3). The Regulations will
obviously deal with such transactions hereafter. On the other hand, the
House Report anticipates that the Regulations will exempt low-interest stu-
dent loans, insurance policy loans, regular savings accounts at financial insti-
tutions, and similar "occasional transactions . . . not designed to shift
income." H.Rep. 98-432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1378 (Mar. 5, 1984).
For compensation-related loans, the Regulations may exempt employee-
relocation loans under the "no significant effect" rubric (see Conf. Rep.
1023), but there is only one stated de minimis exception; namely, aggregate
loans of $10,000 or less to the borrower. Presumably, this will cover most
small advances for travel expenses or other day-to-day routing allowances for
someone who has not otherwise borrowed any money from the company
(regardless of the interest rate). The statute withdraws even this small excep-
tion for both compensation-related and corporation-shareholder loans as to
"any loan the interest arrangements of which have as 1 of their principal
purposes the avoidance of any Federal tax" (e.g., FICA taxes). I.R.C. §
7872(c)(3)(B).
As to gift loans "directly between individuals" (i.e., trusts and family cor-
porations are not included), a separate $10,000 de minimis exception also
applies if, after aggregated husband and wife as one lender (and again, regard-
less of the interest rates charged), the loan proceeds are not found "directly
attributable to the purchase or carrying of income-producing assets"-
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conclusively presumed to be the only type of tax avoidance individuals are
interested in. Compare I.R.C. § 7872(c)(3)(B) with I.R.C. § 7872(c)(2)(B).
Acknowledging (but rejecting) the vigorous pre-enactment opposition to any
test that requires the donor to invade the privacy of the donee's income tax
return, "the conferees wish to emphasize that this is an anti-abuse provision,
and should be interpreted in light of its purpose of preventing the avoidance
of the assignment of income rules and the grantor trust rules." Conf. Rep.
1021.
4. Gift Loans for Consumption
Gift loans used by a borrower for his consumption needs (e.g., education,
medical costs, housing or the like), as contrasted to reinvestment for interest
or dividend income, are given more liberal treatment. If the borrower's net
investment income for the year does not exceed $1,000 (determined under §
163(d)(3) and including a ratable portion of any deferred payment obliga-
tions held-even a U.S. savings bond), then the new income tax rules do not
apply at all to loans "directly between individuals" of up to $100,000 from
each lender (husband and wife being treated as one). I.R.C. § 7872(d)(1).
Nevertheless, if one of the loans' "principal purposes [is] the avoidance of any
Federal tax," the Regulations may disqualify the use of low-interest loans:
perhaps if used to establish a venture that throws off business rather than
investment income. An indigent may still be able to buy a Rolls Royce,
unless the tax collector decrees that any loan to someone who has no income
is a sham per se and not worthy of the still essential debtor/creditor
classification.
Even if the borrower has net investment income of more than $1,000 dur-
ing the year, aggregate non-tax avoidance gift loans of $100,000 or less will
subject the lender to tax only on the amount of the borrower's net investment
income for the year. I.R.C. § 7872(d)(1)(A). Accordingly, if the borrower
(and his spouse, if any) nets only 6% on the gift loan and his other resources
during the year, the lender's imputed interest income and the borrower's
imputed interest deduction is limited to the 6% earned (cf., the grantor trust
rules).
If the borrower has gift loans from different lenders (e.g., his parents and
grandparents), then his net investment income will be allocated proportion-
ately between the loans on the basis of what would have been their imputed
interest shares. I.R.C §7872(d)(1)(C). There does not appear to be any
requirement that the borrower's net investment income be apportioned only
to the period the loan was outstanding during the year, so that presumably a
gift loan made or paid off in October, for example, must deal with the bor-
rower's net investment income for the entire year.
B. Gift Tax
Since the Act inserts the new interest-free and below-market interest loan
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rules into the Code as § 7872 (i.e., under Chapter 80 prescribing general rules
for provisions affecting more than one subtitle of the Code), the new valua-
tion rules, as well as the $10,000 de minimis aggregate loan exception, now
also apply for gift tax purposes. The $100,000/net investment income excep-
tion, however, is applicable only "[f]or purposes of Subtitle A" (i.e., income
taxes) and, therefore, does not carry over to the gift tax area. See I.R.C. §
7872(d)(1)(A).
The statute also makes clear that, in the initial transfer step, the value of a
term gift loan cannot be reported as a ratable gift each year on December 31,
as its conversion to demand loan status for income tax purposes would
appear to require. I.R.C. § 7872(d)(2). The form of a term loan between
family members is, therefore, fully recognized in its gift tax context, even
though for income tax timing purposes it is disregarded and treated in sub-
stance as a demand loan for reporting simplicity (and possibly increased
revenue since the usually higher Federal rate applicable to the initial stated
term still applies when valuing the retransfer of interest for income tax pur-
poses in each subsequent year). See Conf. Rep. 1020 at fn. 11.
C. Estate Tax
The statute directs the Secretary to prescribe regulations requiring a below-
market term loan to be valued in the estate of the lender in a manner consist-
ent with the gift tax treatment of that loan. I.R.C. § 7872(g)(2). The same
uniform valuation rules will now be applied for estate tax purposes as to any
term loans made, renegotiated, extended or revised after June 6, 1984. See
TRA § 172(c)(5).
Conclusion
There is nothing simple about the new interest-free and below-market
interest rules. No party to a term loan, for example, can compute his tax
liability without present value tables or a calculator.
Absent an extraordinary degree of tolerance in the Regulations, only the
$10,000 de minimis exception is available to cover the multitude of routine
transactions that may now be classified as below-market loans. Nor are there
any convenient safe harbors, like the old 6% or 9% minimum interest rates
under § 483.
In employer-employee situations, the FICA tax implications can be
serious. Although Chapter 24 income tax withholding is not required, Chap-
ter 21 FICA tax payments are. See Conf. Rep. 1019.
The use of term loans in a nongift context (remember: term gift loans are
treated as demand loans for timing the income tax results) is not going to be
tax neutral hereafter. Paradoxically, new § 7872's attempt to sweep tax avoi-
dance loans into its ambit appears to be thwarted by its own provisions, since
the only time a term loan arrangement will now be used is to lock in a low
term rate (like the 10% transitional rate in place through December 31, 1984)
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in the special employer-employee loan category (i.e., nontransferable and
conditioned on future services) or to shift the tax impact on one, or perhaps
both, of the parties to the transaction due to the failure of the original issue
discount rules to match the interest income/deduction element to the com-
pensation paid/received side of the transaction.
Interest-free loans to help a child finance his higher education or a parent
enjoy a more secure retirement are still practical, but not as pure income-
shifting devices as in the past. Clifford trusts are available for that (and the
gift tax cost-under the new actuarial tables at 10% interest compounded
annually, could be a small bargain, depending on the term required).
New questions are raised if the family member prepays his note before its
scheduled maturity (no gift tax recovery and, since deemed a demand loan
for income tax timing purposes, presumably no cancellation of indebtedness
income to the father), or the lender extends the loan's maturity at some point
along the way (pretty clearly a new gift), or the loan is modified to begin
charging some interest (recomputations needed all around, assuming the
lender does not follow a regular pattern of giving the family member the
interest payments, see Conf. Rep. 1021).
Few will be faulted if they cannot fathom the new rules. Even more may
choose to disregard them. The tax system will be the losers, if they do.
